- 소셜플랫폼의 사회적 영향력 분석 및 발전방향 연구
- [나스미디어] 2024년 8월 MEDIA & MARKET ISSUE
- [미디어 데이터 클리핑] 2022년 4월 미디어 데이터 클리핑 - 데이팅 앱
- [메조미디어] 2024 업종 분석 리포트 04. 건강기능식품
- 2024년 8월 미디어 이슈 리포트
- [2023년 6월] 2023 상반기 Media Trend Report
- 2016년 인터넷 노출형광고 결산 보고
- 2024년 소비 트렌드 리포트 02. 초단축 소비
- [메조미디어]2024 타켓 분석 리포트 - 30대
- [메조미디어]2024 타켓 분석 리포트 - 20대
자료요약
This paper considers a duopoly where switching costs exist. The analysis proves that temporal price reductions can be pure strategy equilibrium where firms earn more profit than in a regular price strategy. Greater profits result from price discrimination in temporal price reductions. The equilibrium is contrasted with previous studies, which explain temporal price reductions as a result of mixed strategy. In a given model with an assumption about forming switching cost, firms can control their range of loyal consumers by properly setting their regular and promotional prices. The model shows that temporal price reduction tends to raise the regular price and decrease the range of loyal consumers.
목차
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Empirical studies
Ⅲ. Model
Ⅳ. Profit-maximizing prices
4.1 Cooperative regular price strategy
4.2 Cooperative alternating promotion strategy
4.3 Non-cooperative alternating promotion strategy
Ⅴ. Summary and further discussions
References
Ⅱ. Empirical studies
Ⅲ. Model
Ⅳ. Profit-maximizing prices
4.1 Cooperative regular price strategy
4.2 Cooperative alternating promotion strategy
4.3 Non-cooperative alternating promotion strategy
Ⅴ. Summary and further discussions
References
Price discrimination
Temporal promotions
Switching cost
Loyalty